Finding an Existential Ethic

Philosophy 211 Fall 1999

By Tara Phillips

for Bob Lane

 

Existential philosophy is subject to a single, seemingly debilitating criticism: it comprises a frame of mind rather than a theory. As Mary Warnock argues in her book Existentialist Ethics, "It seems that to be attracted by Existentialism is to be attracted by a mood. When it comes to serious thought, one may find . . . that it is necessary to cast off the mood and start again" (57). The focus of the existentialist is on the individual, existing being. By nature, the subject of existentialism appears incommunicable. It demands that each individual come to an understanding of the inwardness of self independently. This inwardness is not a state which can be achieved, but a process of constantly coming to be. The argument against the existence of an existential ideology seems valid. Without generalization, how can existentialist philosophy construct a theory that offers ethical direction?

 

Although Mary Warnock argues that existentialism is a mood, this conclusion fails to reflect the full complexity of existentialism. Though it lacks in generalization and is of an individual, arguably incommunicable nature, existentialist philosophy is, at its root, a universal construction of ethics. Before advancing this claim, it is necessary to consider what is meant by the term "ethics". Ethics refer to an individual’s choices rather than the guidelines of society, known as morals, which dictate conformity. In existential thought ethics displace morals because ethics relate to the existentialist’s primary concern: the individual.

 

Finding the underlying values common to existentialists allows an understanding of the basic substructure of existential philosophy. There is a set of basic existential truths that run through existential thought: (1) existence precedes essence, (2) human beings have free will, and (3) all actions and thoughts are results of decisions. These foundations of existentialism can be translated into an existential theory of ethics which holds at its center the tenet that all beings must be free in order to posses the essence of being. From this concept come the dictates of an existential ethic.

 

The first and most vital of these dictates is the idea of personal commitment. Existential commitment requires constant thought, expression, and action to develop personal essence. It is a dynamic and constant reaffirmation of personal faith; of coming to be. Faith is the simplest example of existential action. Kierkegaard explores faith through his discussion of Christianity. In his philosophy, Kierkegaard maintains that Christian faith or "inwardness" must constitute a state of continual reaffirmation of belief. Faced with the knowledge that Christianity provides no secure argument for the existence of God, the believer must make a choice to believe despite the irrationality of such a decision. Christian commitment is personal, passionate, and demands constant reconsideration and reaffirmation. It is a dynamic, rather than a passive belief. Kierkegaard writes:

 

Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and objective uncertainty. If I can grasp God objectively, I do not believe, but because I cannot know God objectively, I must have faith, and if I will preserve myself in faith, I must constantly be determined to hold fast to the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the ocean’s deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water, and still believe. (40)

 


In Kierkegaard’s writing, the idea of constantly working to hold fast to a subjective faith is the only way to be a true believer. Believing in name only is existentially irrelevant.

 

Jean-Paul Sartre offers another example of how action is the only true affirmation of faith. In his philosophical writing, Sartre holds that to be a self-professed atheist, Christian, or hero means nothing if it is not followed by the action of that faith. Professing to be something, which is not reflected in action, is, according to Sartre, bad faith. To say that one is a Christian, and then not to abide by Christian doctrine is a demonstration of bad faith. Active faith requires the action match the claim. In Sartre’s play, No Exit, the character of Garcin demonstrates Sartre’s claim that what you say you are means nothing unless your actions are congruent with your claims. Garcin continues to claim heroism even though he fled at the first sign of real danger. Inez is the voice of Sartre, arguing that without action, a claim means nothing and demonstrates nothing of “true essence”:

 

Garcin: Listen! Each man has an aim in life, a leading motive; that’s so, isn’t it? Well, I didn’t give a damn for wealth, or for love. I aimed at being a real man. A tough, as they say. I staked everything on the same horse. . . . Can one possibly be a coward when one’s deliberately courted danger at every turn? And can one judge a life by a single action?

Inez: Why not? For thirty years you dreamt you were a hero, and condoned a thousand petty lapses - because a hero, of course, can do no wrong. An easy method, obviously. Then a day came when you were up against it, the red light of real danger - and you took the train to Mexico.

Garcin: I ‘dreamt,’ you say. It was no dream. When I chose the hardest path, I made my choice deliberately. A man is what he wills himself to be.

Inez: Prove it. Prove it was no dream. It’s what one does, and nothing else, that shows the stuff one’s made of. (333)

 

Passive belief does not constitute existential faith. It is through action that human essence is defined. Personal, active commitment is paramount to an existential ethic.

 

A second foundation of existential ethics is the concept that choices are individual, the responsibility of the person who makes them. This belief in personal choice and responsibility is demonstrated by Heidegger’s discussion of death as the most significant act of a life. According to Heidegger, death "forces us to realize that what we are is determined only after we have completed our last act, and, therefore, we are free to choose what we are to be" (Oaklander 156). The recognition of life’s potential, aroused by the consideration of death, brings focus to the responsibility of the individual in the shaping and living of his/her life. Existential awareness leads to a recognition that it is the individual’s duty to accept not only the responsibility of making the decisions, but the burden of living with them once they have been made.

 

It is important to existentialists that decisions made, though the exclusive responsibility of the individual, be based upon more than the pleasure or comfort of that individual alone. As Nietzsche points out in Human All Too Human, "[O]ne calls individual actions good or bad quite irrespective of their motives but solely on account of their useful or harmful consequences" (135). The value of the action is based upon its effect on other beings in the world. Those actions, which limit the freedom of other individuals, are seen as the least desirable actions to take. Evaluation of an action should not be based on the belief that good or evil is inherent in the action itself, irrespective of the consequences (Nietzsche 135), but on the actual effects of the particular action. Existential decisions are not a simple case of "black and white". The goodness in any decision is relevant, allowing for the consideration of the effects that the action will have on other individuals. The final decision made should reflect the common good.

 

A final, fundamental dictate of existential ethics is the individual’s recognition that freedom cannot be limited by demands. In existential ethics, demands cannot exist because death is always an option. This is central to the argument Camus presents in The Myth of Sisyphus. He opens his argument with the suggestion that once one chooses to live, all other decisions are secondary:

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. (3)

 

The acceptance of death as an option, albeit one that existentialists recognize as generally absurd, frees the individual to make choices based upon personal, essential beliefs. An individual may choose death as the most ethical choice at any point in his/her life. This choice would be most relevant in situations where the death of an individual would protect the existence and freedom of many others, or of those who are deemed more deserving of life.

 

An existential ethic is a firm foundation for a "planetary ethic". Throughout a world of diverse religious beliefs, social structures, government powers, and linguistic systems there lies a consistent thread: the individual. The existential ethic demands the individual come to terms with self. A person is responsible for his/her actions, including his/her effect on others. The existentialist must confront how their personal decision making is reflected in world issues, such as hunger, pollution, and ethnic cleansing. As to Mary Warnock’s "mood": ha!

An existential ethic provides a root for a functional, universal ethic.

 

 


Works Cited

 
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus and other essays. New York: Vintage
Books, 1991.
Kierkegaard, Soren. "Concluding Unscientific Postscript". Oaklander 32-46.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Human, All Too Human". Oaklander 128-135.
Oaklander, Nathan L. Existential Philosophy: An Introduction. New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1996.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. "No Exit". Oaklander 323-335.
Warnock, Mary. Existentialist Ethics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Human, All Too Human". Oaklander 128-135.